

## Message Text

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ACTION NEA-13

INFO OCT-01 AF-10 EUR-25 IO-14 ISO-00 ACDA-19 CIAE-00

DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04

RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20 USIA-15 SAM-01 OMB-01

TRSE-00 DPW-01 SR-02 ORM-03 EB-11 SAB-01 DRC-01 /180 W

----- 086964

R 190911Z FEB 74

FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1546

INFO USINT ALGIERS

AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

USINT CAIRO

USMISSION GENEVA

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY RABAT

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

AMEMBASSY TUNIS

USMISSION USUN NY

UNCLAS SECTION 1 OF 2 TEL AVIV 939

EO 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR XF IS

SUBJ: EBAN ON MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT SITUATION

GENEVA FOR MEPC DEL

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BEIRUT PASS DAMASCUS AND BAGHDAD

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1. SUMMARY. EBAN IN FEB 15 PRESS INTERVIEW SAID OCT WAR HAD FAVORABLE POLITICAL OUTCOME FOR ISRAEL. DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT DEMONSTRATED EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI SPIRIT OF COMPROMISE. ISRAEL HAD TO ABANDON IDEA OF TOTAL DEMILITARIZATION OF AREAS EVACUATED IN CASE OF SINAI, BUT NOT NECESSARILY IN CASE OF SYRIAN AND JORDANIAN FRONTS. SADAT'S TRUE INTENTION TO SEEK PEACE WITH ISRAEL HAD NOT YET BEEN PROVEN IN EBAN'S VIEW. ISRAEL WOULD MAKE NO COMPROMISE ON POW'S TO GET SYRIAN-ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT BUT WOULD MAKE REASONABLE OFFER WHEN POW ISSUE IS RESOLVED. SADAT WAS POLITICALLY VULNERABLE FOR HAVING PRECEDED SYRIA ON DISENGAGEMENT, AND ISRAEL IN ANY CASE WANTED DISENGAGEMENT WITH SYRIA. GENEVA CONFERENCE WAS EXPECTED TO BE REACTIVATED IN APRIL REGARDLESS OF WHETHER SYRIAN-ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT HAD BEEN AGREED OR NOT. SOVIETS WERE VERY PLEASED WITH EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT EVEN THOUGH THEY DID NOT HELP ACHIEVE IT. SOVIETS MIGHT SEEK RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL DURING "ENXT STAGE," INTER ALIA TO STRENGTHEN THEIR HAND AT GENEVA. END SUMMARY.

2. IN LENGTHY HAARETZ INTERVIEW FEB 15 FOREIGN MINISTER EBAN MADE FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS.

3. OUTCOME OF OCT WAR. ACCORDING TO EBAN, IT IS INCORRECT TO SAY OCT WAR REPRESENTED MILITARY VICTORY BUT POLITICAL DEFEAT FOR ISRAEL, AS WAR BROUGHTTWO EGYPTIAN POLITICAL CONCESSIONS UNATTAINABLE BEFORE WAR; (A) NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA WITHOUT ADVANCE ISRAELI COMMITMENT ON TOTAL WITHDRAWAL AND (B) WHAT AMOUNTS TO INTERIM SUEZ CANAL SETTLEMENT WITHOUT ADVANCE ISRAELI COMMITMENT ON TOTAL WITHDRAWAL. IT IS TRUE THAT ISRAELI ABANDONMENT OF PREVIOUS DEMAND THAT ANY ARAB TERRITORY EVACUATED BY IDF BE TOTALLY DEMILITARIZED; IT ALSO INVOLVES SOMEWHAT LARGER EGYPTIAN MILITARY PRESENCE EAST OF CANAL THAN ENVISIONED UNDER TERMS OF INTERIM SUEZ SETTLEMENT AS IT WAS BEING DISCUSSED IN 1971. BUT THIS IS BECAUSE OCT WAR, THOUGH ENDING IN ISRAELI MILITARY VICTORY, WAS NOT CLEARCUT SWEEPING VICTORY, AND DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT REFLECTS MILITARY REALITIES OF WAR.

4. IN FACT, WHEN EBAN FIRST HEARD FROM SECRETARY KISSINGER UNCLASSIFIED

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OF EXTENT OF EGYPTIAN THINNING OUT OF FORCES EAST OF CANAL TO WHICH CAIRO HAD AGREED, HE COULD NOT BELIEVE HIS EARS AND MADE SECRETARY REPEAT THE FIGURES. EBAN ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE TO APPRECIATION BY ISRAELI PUBLIC OF REASONABLE BALANCE ACHIEVED IN DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT BETWEEN CONCESSIONS AND ADVANTAGES, AS AGREEMENT WILL BE MODEL FOR FURTHER EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI AGREEMENTS IN FUTURE.

5. DEMILITARIZATION CONCEPTS. AS FOR CONCEPT OF TOTAL DEMILITARIZATION IN AREAS EVACUATED BY ISRAEL, IT IS NOT ATTAINABLE AS FAR AS SINAI IS CONCERNED. ALSO, IT MAY NOT BE PRACTICAL AS CONCERNS POPULATED AREAS. BUT FACT ISRAEL HAS RESIGNED ITSELF TO CERTAIN EGYPTIAN MILITARY PRESENCE EAST OF CANAL DOES NOT NECESSARILY MEAN ISRAEL WILL AGREE TO STATIONING OF ARAB ARMED FORCES IN AREAS ISRAEL WILL EVACUATE ON JORDANIAN OR SYRIAN FRONTS.

6. SADAT'S TRUE INTENTIONS. EBAN HAS BEEN MISQUOTED AS SAYING SADAT HAS PROVED HE WANTS PEACE. EBAN BELIEVES ISRAELI LEADERS WHO SAY THIS ARE SPEAKING PREMATURELY. WHAT EBAN HAD SAID WAS THAT SECRETARY KISSINGER BELIEVES SADAT HAS PASSED TURNING POINT OF CHOOSING TO CONCENTRATE ON EGYPTIAN DEVELOPMENT AND REMOVE DANGERS OF RENEWED WAR. SADAT EVIDENTLY WANTS TO FOSTER HIS CREDIBILITY IN ISRAELI EYES, BUT THIS DOES NOT NECESSARILY MEAN HE IS SERIOUS ABOUT TERMINATING BELLIGERENCY; IF HE IS, LET HIM SAY SO.

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7. SYRIAN-ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT. IT IS POSITIVE PROPOSAL FOR US TO REQUEST THAT ISRAEL PREPARE GENERAL PLAN FOR SYRIAN-ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT, AS SYRIANS LIKE EGYPTIANS BEFORE THEM ARE NOT IN POSITION TO MAKE REASONABLE OFFER, AND IT IS EASIER FOR ISRAEL TO DO SO. BUT THERE IS NO CHANCE ISRAEL WILL TRANSMIT ANY SYRIAN DISENGAGEMENT IDEAS TO US BEFORE IT HAS RECEIVED POW LIST AND ICRC VISITS HAVE BEGUN. AT SAME TIME IT IS UNREALISTIC TO THINK SIMPLE SYRIAN-  
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ISRAELI POW EXCHANGE CAN BE ARRANGED WHICH IS NOT PART OF LARGER AGREEMENT COVERING OTHER ISSUES. UNLIKE CASES OF HIJACKINGS, IN WHICH TERRORISTS FREQUENTLY BACK DOWN, ISRAELI INTRANSIGENCE ON POW ISSUE WILL NOT WORK.

8. SADAT'S POLITICAL VULNERABILITY. " IT IS NATURAL THAT EGYPT SHOULD WANT TO BE ACCOMPANIED TO GENEVA BY ANOTHER ARAB COUNTRY, AND A RADICAL ONE (I.E. SYRIA). WHAT IS HAPPENING IN EGYPT, INCLUDING THE DISMISSAL OF HEIKAL, AND ALL THAT WE HEAR OUT OF LIBYA AND ALGERIA--ALL THIS GOES TO SHOW THAT SADAT HAS SOME DIFFICULTIES IN EXPLAINING WHY HE AGREED TO ACQUIESCE IN SOMETHING TO WHICH HE REFUSED TO AGREE BEFORE THE YOM KIPPUR WAR. HOWEVER, IF, ALTHOUGH AN EFFORT WILL BE MADE, NO AGREEMENT IS REACHED WITH SYRIAN, EGYPT WILL HAVE TO REEXAMINE THE QUESTION OF WHETHER IT WANTS TO SUBJECT ITS INTERESTS TO SYRIAN SOVEREIGNTY. ... ONE HAS THE IMPRESSION THAT SADAT IS NOT TALKING IDLE NONSENSE WHEN HE SAYS IT IS DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO ADVANCE ON HIS OWN ON THE ROAD TO PEACE WITH ISRAEL. THE MAIN POINT IS THAT A SEPARATION OF FORCES ON THE NORTHERN FRONT IS A POSITIVE THING FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW BECAUSE IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT THE EXISTING SITUATION CAN CONTINUE FOR ANY LENGTH OF TIME WITHOUT A FLARE-UP OF HOSTILITIES."

9. REACTIVATING GENEVA CONFERENCE. IT WILL BE NO EGYPTIAN CONCESSION TO ISRAEL FOR CAIRO TO AGREE EVENTUALLY TO REACTIVATION OF GENEVA CONFERENCE, REGARDLESS OF WHAT HAPPENS ON SYRIAN FRONT. FOR EGYPT TO DO OTHERWISE WOULD IMPLY

ACQUIESCENCE IN EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT AS PERMANENT AND NOT MERELY STEPPING STONE TOWARD COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT, THE VERY ACCUSATION EGYPTIANS CURRENTLY ARE TRYING TO PARRY. CONSENSUS IS THAT GENEVA WILL BE REACTIVATED IN APRIL, NO MATTER WHERE THINGS STAND WITH SYRIAN DISENGAGEMENT.

10. JORDAN. POSSIBILITY OF ISRAELI-JORDANIAN INTERIM AGREEMENT OF SOME KIND (BUT NOT DISENGAGEMENT) SHOULD NOT BE RULED OUT, BUT NO IDEAS ABOUT SUCH AGREEMENT ARE BEING DISCUSSED IN GOI.

11. SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT.  
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" I HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THEY ARE SO PLEASED WITH THE RESULT THAT THEY ARE WILLING TO PUT UP WITH THE FRUSTRATION OF NOT HAVING HAD A HAND IN ITS ACHIEVEMENT." BESIDES WANTING SUEZ CANAL REOPENED, SOVIETS HAD SLEEPLESS NIGHTS OVER THREAT TO WORLD PEACE WHICH ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN FIGHTING REPRESENTED. FROM HIS TALK WITH GROMYKO EBAN GATHERED MOSCOW TOOK " VERY GRAVE VIEW" OF HOW BAD THINGS COULD HAVE GONE IN MIDDLE EAST.

12. SOVIET-ISRAELI RELATIONS. EBAN UNDERSTOOD FROM GROMYKO CONVERSATION THAT SOVIETS HAVE ON THEIR MINDS REESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL, WHICH AMONG OTHER THINGS WOULD REINFORCE THEIR STATUS AT GENEVA CONFERENCE. " IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT THE SOVIETS WILL MAKE AN EFFORT AT THE NEXT STAGE, WHEN THERE IS A DIFFERENT REALITY AND WHEN THEIR ROLE WILL HAVE THE APPEARANCE OF GREATER EQUALITY AND BALANCE."  
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## Message Attributes

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